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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

The tribulations of a taxpayer who has overpaid his federal income tax and,
believing that the taxing authorities intend only to do exact justice in assessing
and collecting the actual amount of tax due from him, sets out to recover the
amount overpaid are vividly revealed in a case to which attention has been
directed by a member of the accountancy profession.
Here is a brief statement of the taxpayer’s case:
John Doe filed his federal income-tax return for the year 1925 on or before
March 15, 1926. He received no communication nor inquiry concerning it
from any governmental sources whatever, the return apparently being ac
cepted as correct.
On March 12, 1929, he filed a claim for refund of his 1925 income tax, based
upon a correction of his failure to deduct $2,000 paid by him as a commission
on a sale of real estate made in 1925.
On or about June 1, 1929, a revenue agent called upon John Doe to audit
his 1925 claim for refund. The revenue agent stated that he would make a
regular, detailed audit of all items of the 1925 tax return and proceeded to do
so. In the course of his audit he allowed the commission as a proper deduc
tion that should have been made originally, but “found” that the taxpayer
had deducted excessive depreciation on certain properties. The excessive
depreciation found by the revenue agent amounted to $2,000. The revenue
agent thereupon advised the taxpayer that while it was true that the $2,000
deduction for commission was an allowable deduction, the excessive depre
ciation would be an equal offset against the refund and, therefore, no refund
would be made.

The only remarkable thing about this case is that, as happens so frequently,
upon audit of a claim for refund the examining officer finds some additional tax
due which equals, if it does not exceed, the amount claimed by the taxpayer.
However, let us consider the law in this specific case:
Under the acts of 1924 and 1926, the taxpayer has until March 15, 1930, to
make a claim for refund of overpayment of income tax returned for the year
1925. The commissioner has until March 15, 1930, to assess a deficiency of tax
if found by him in a 1925 tax return. In view of the fact that the settlement of
the question of overpayment and deficiency of tax can be made as late as
March 15, 1930, it is presumed that in due course John Doe will receive from the
commissioner an answer to his claim for refund.
He will also receive from the commissioner prior to March 15, 1930, an asser
tion of a deficiency because of the excessive depreciation. Then he will have
just sixty days within which to appeal to the United States board of tax ap
peals against the assessment of the deficiency. If he thus appeals he will then
wait a year or two before the board gets to his case. In the meantime, the com
missioner will withhold payment of the refund until the whole matter has been
adjudicated by the board.
All of which is according to the law, however whimsical it may seem and
however ponderous is the machinery by which the law is administered.
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One can readily realize how exasperating this is to the taxpayer, but nothing
can be done about it. We sometimes ponder upon the ingenuity of the minds
that evolved so intricate a device for the imposing and collecting of federal taxes.
Of course the machinery creaks just as loudly when it is producing a decision on
a one-hundred-dollar item as it does in producing a million-dollar decision.
It roars, puffs, crunches as the examination of the taxpayer’s claim proceeds
from the board to the court of claims or the circuit court of appeals, and some
times to the supreme court of the United States. One looks upon the dauntless
and solemn operators of the machine with awe, augmented by the intricate
character of the proceedings, opinions and rulings, and the heavy solemnity of
the operators. It seems to the lay mind little less than sacrilegious to feed the
machinery a claim for less than a million dollars.
In the instant case it is interesting to speculate as to what would have hap
pened if John Doe had in his original return deducted the commission paid.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Collection of 1918 taxes assessed in 1919 for which a bond was given in 1919
pursuant to section 234 (a) (14) (a), act of 1918, in connection with claims for
abatement thereof, binding the taxpayer as principal and the surety to pay
“ any part of such tax found by the commissioner to be due ” is held not barred
under sec. 250 (d), act of 1918, and similar limitations provisions of subsequent
acts, the making of the bond giving the United States a cause of action separate
and distinct from an action to collect taxes, and such sections can not be ex
tended by implication to a suit upon a subsequent and substituted contract.
(Supreme court of the United States. The United States v. The John Barth
Company and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company.)
Such portion of a “return bag liability” account, representing the difference
between the cost of bags in which the taxpayer’s product was shipped and the
amount charged purchasers of the product for such bags, under a provision by
which the taxpayer retained the property in the bags and agreed, upon their
return, to refund the amount charged therefor, should be included in income for
1919, as experience had established represented the income from bags that would
not be returned. (Court of claims of the United States. Alpha Portland Ce
ment Co. v. The United States.)
A corporation may not deduct donations to the American Red Cross and simi
lar organizations.
The disallowance for 1918 by the commissioner of credit for income and ex
cess-profits taxes paid in 1918 to the British government which were expenses
of the taxpayer’s London office, the books of which were kept on the cashreceipts-and-disbursements basis, and his determination that the taxpayer’s
books were on the accrual basis were not shown to be erroneous, there being no
evidence that the greater proportion of the taxpayer’s accounts were not kept
on the accrual basis.
Earned surplus may not include the difference between the cash purchase
price of stock and the par value of such stock, where the value of the stock when
acquired was not in excess of the purchase price. (Court of claims of the
United States. Niles Bement Pond Co. v. The United States.)
Taxable gain on non-assignable life-insurance policies taken out in 1899 pay
able to the estate of the insured, fully paid up in 1908, realized in 1919 upon the
exercise, at the end of a tontine period of twenty years, of an option to receive
the face of the policies plus “ the cash dividend then apportioned by the com
pany,” was held to be that portion of the total gain attributable to the policies
which accrued after March 1, 1913, to be ascertained as the excess of the amount
received over the sum of the insurance-reserve liability and the dividend ac
cumulations provisionally apportioned to the policies on March 1, 1913. The
judgment of the court of appeals in 27 Fed. (2d) 237, noted at 98.34, vol. I,
which fixed the March 1, 1913, value of the policies by discounting, as of that
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date, at 4 percent, the total estimated value of the policies at their maturity,
was affirmed, for, while it did not ascertain the March 1, 1913, value or the
taxable gain with accuracy, the accuracy of such computation was not ques
tioned and it gave a result of which the taxpayer can not complain.
In applying sec. 202 (a) (1), act of 1918, to an insurance policy having no
market value, in determining the taxable gain realized upon the exercise at the
end of a tontine period, of the option to receive the face of the policies plus the
cash dividend then apportioned by the company, March 1, 1913, value is at
most merely a method of allocating a known income to the periods in which it
actually accrued, its fair value on such date being that part actually realized by
the taxpayer which, by the use of appropriate accounting methods, can fairly
be said to have accrued before March 1, 1913. (Supreme court of the United
States. Robert H. Lucas, collector of internal revenue for the District of Ken
tucky, v. Kate Halloway Alexander, et al., etc.)
Held that the conclusion that no part of the cost of units of one share of pre
ferred and two shares of common stock should be allocated to the common
stock which held the voting rights is not warranted on the ground that the
value of the common stock “was highly speculative and entirely prospective,”
since there is generally an existing value even in speculative and prospective
values, and in view of the fact that the common stock had the voting rights.
B. T. A. Dec. 2756 reversed and remanded to determine a fair apportionment of
cost as between the two classes of stock. If no apportionment can be made,
the taxpayer is not chargeable with gain upon the sale of such stock until he
shall have recovered the entire purchase price. (United States circuit court of
appeals, sixth circuit. Harry E. Collin v. Commissioner.)
The jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals is limited to a review of the
decisions of the board of tax appeals upon matters of law and does not extend to
an inquiry in disputed questions of fact. (United States circuit court of ap
peals for fifth circuit. E. G. Robichaux Company, Ltd., v. Commissioner.)
The decedent’s gross estate should not include the present value of 90 per
cent. of the principal of eight so-called charitable trusts except as to the one
first terminated by the death of the beneficiary thereof, which pass to ten
charitable and religious corporations under the residuary clause of a will, where
the will provided that the trust funds of such eight charitable trusts were to be
come part of the residuary estate upon the death of the beneficiaries thereof,
and a codicil thereto modified the legacies to the religious and charitable institu
tions by providing that the proceeds of lapsed legacies and devises or illegal
devises should not increase the residuary estate and excluding such institutions
from sharing in any part of the estate except any remainder as shall exist or ap
pear if all the devises and legacies in the will and codicil were duly capitalized
and created, the estate was insufficient to pay all legacies and trusts in full, and
the state court, in construing the will, directed payments of 91 per cent. of the
legacies and trusts, and provided for a pro rata distribution of the eight chari
table trusts among the survivors, charitable and otherwise, since to use the
eight charitable trusts, except the one first terminated to supply the deficiency
either in the other seven or any of the other trusts and legacies, would violate
the state rule of perpetuities. Since none of the eight charitable trusts had
been terminated by death, the court held, on the basis of mortality tables, that
the first trust to be terminated would be that of the oldest beneficiaries, the
present value of which should be included in the gross estate. (United States
district court, northern district of New York. Francis E. Hidden & Empire
Trust Company as executors of the last will and testament of Thomas E. Hidden,
deceased, v. Cyrus Durey, collector of internal revenue of the 14th district of New
York.)
The collection of 1917 tax after the expiration of the statutory period is un
lawful, there being no authority for the waivers executed after the statute had
run, the waivers being without consideration. (District court of the United
States, western district of Pennsylvania. Spear & Co. v. D. B. Heiner,
collector.)
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